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Child Support Properly a Factor in

Determining Best Interests of Child in
Voluntary Termination of Parental Rights
In re R.AS.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Termination of parental rights is available only by statute.2 Missouri
provides for voluntary termination of parental rights only if the parent whose
rights are to be terminated has consented in writing to the termination and if
the termination will be in the best interests of the child.' All Missouri
statutory provisions concerning termination of parental rights are to be
"construed so as to promote the best interests and welfare of the child."4 The
factors to be considered in determining the "best interest of the child" are
6
enumerated in the statute,5 but they are quite general.
Problems arise when using these guidelines in a proceeding to voluntarily
terminate the parental rights of an absent parent. What role does the child's
right to parental support play? How strong is the policy of parental support?
Are fathers, especially absent or putative fathers, treated differently than
mothers in the area of voluntary termination of parental rights? This Note,
which focuses on the Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals'
recent decision in In re R.A.S.,7 addresses these issues. In R.A.S., the court
of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of a petition for voluntary
termination of the parental rights of an absent father.' The court held that
when a parent desires voluntary termination to avoid parental support
responsibilities and termination would produce no benefit to the child, the
"best interests" requirement is not met and termination should be denied.9

1. 826 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
2. In re W.J.F. and H.M.S., 648 S.W.2d 210, 214 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
3. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.444.1 (1986).
4. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.443 (1986).

5. Id.

6. "(1) The recognition and protection of the constitutional rights of all parties in
the proceedings; (2) The recognition and protection of the birth family relationship
when possible and appropriate; and (3)The entitlement of every child to a permanent
and stable home." Id.
7. 826 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
8. RA.S., 826 S.W.2d at 401; see id. at 398-99.

9. Id at 401.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING

In re R.A.S. involved a voluntary termination of a father's parental
rights.' o The child, R.A.S., was born in 1983 and was eight years old at the
time of the termination hearing." His mother was eighteen and his father
was fifteen at the time of conception.' The father asserted that he did not
even remember having sexual relations with the mother and suggested that he

was intoxicated when it may have happened. 3 The mother asserted that they
had an ongoing sexual relationship. 4 Regardless of which account was
correct, he was adjudicated the father after the child's paternity was established through a series of blood tests."5 The child's mother never denied the
father access to the child, but the father never visited the child and never
developed a relationship with him. 6 At the time of the hearing, the mother
was divorcing another man.' No adoption of R.A.S. was planned."
The father had been ordered to pay child support, but had paid only a
nominal amount. 9

The mother supported her child, but wos on public

assistance in the form of food stamps.2" The father did not intend to
establish any relationship with his son.2 He consented to voluntary termination of his parental rights to the child.'
The deputy juvenile officer
interviewed the parents and filed a petition to terminate the father's parental
rights.' The child was not interviewed.2
A hearing was held in the Circuit Court of Callaway County." The
deputy juvenile officer testified that it would be in the best interests of the
child to terminate the father's parental rights.26 Judge Gene Hamilton

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 398.
Id
Id. at 401.
Id at 398.
Id
Id
Id. at 398-99.
Id. at 398.

18. Id. at 401.
19. Id at 398.
20. Id.

21. Id
22. Id
23. Id. at 399.

24. Id.
25. Id at 398.
26. Id at 399.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss4/6
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dismissed the petition for voluntary termination, finding that termination
would not be in the child's best interests.'
The father appealed on four points, asserting (1) that if the proceeding
had been for involuntary termination of parental rights, there would have been
sufficient evidence to find abandonment or neglect and therefore the trial court
erred in finding that it was not in the best interests of the child to terminate;2" (2) that the public policy of parental support was a weak policy,
insufficient to support the finding that it was not in the best interests of the
child to terminate;29 (3) that because he was fifteen and the mother was
eighteen at the time of conception, the child was the product of a crime
committed by the mother, who thus had "unclean hands" regarding his support
obligation to her;3" and (4) that the trial court unconstitutionally discriminated against him on the basis of his gender.3
Judge Patricia A. Breckenridge of the Western District of the Missouri
Court of Appeals addressed the father's assertions.32 The court held that
when the parent consents to termination to avoid parental responsibilities and
the child would not benefit from termination, it should not be granted.33
With respect to the unclean hands assertion, the court said that child support
is for the child's benefit, not the mother's, and thus allowing the mother to
receive child support would not be tantamount to allowing her to profit from
her criminal act.34 The court determined that the equal protection claim was
not properly raised,35 but then addressed the issue and concluded that there
was no basis for the claim. 6 The court affirmed Judge Hamilton's dismissal
of the petition for voluntary termination.37

27. Id. at 399; see id at 397.
28. Id. at 398-99.
29. Id at 398, 399-400.
30. Id. at 398, 401. Mo. REv. STAT. § 566.040 (1986) creates the crine of
sexual assault in the first degree, which occurs when a person has sexual intercourse
with another person to whom she is not married and who is fourteen or fifteen years
of age.
31. RA.S., 826 S.W.2d at 398, 401.
32. Id.
at 398.
33. See id. at 400-01.
34. Id.
at 401.
35. Id. The court stated that the father cited "no constitutional provision, state or
federal; no statute; or any case which would be applicable to or forbid the allegedly
unequal treatment."
36. Id
37. Id
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Termination of ParentalRights
The power to terminate parental rights is purely statutory; it does not
exist at common law. 8 This power "demands strict and literal compliance"
with the statute granting the power.39 Sections 211.442 through 211.487 of
the Missouri Revised Statutes control termination of parental rights. 4 ° "The
primary concern of the court in any parental rights termination is the best
interest of the child."4' In making this determination, the statute requires a
court to consider the following factors: "(1) The recognition and protection
of the constitutional rights of all parties in the proceedings; (2) [t]he
recognition and protection of the birth family relationship when possible and
appropriate; and (3) [t]he entitlement of every child to a permanent and stable
home."4 The legislature provided for voluntary termination of parental
rights when the court "finds that such termination is in the best interests of the

child and the parent has consented in writing to the termination of his parental
43

rights.u
The legislature also provided for involuntary termination of parental
rights under various circumstances,' such as when a child has been abandoned.45 The involuntary termination statute sets out specific lengths of time
of abandonment justifying involuntary termination. 46 The involuntary
termination provision analogous to the father's "abandonment" in In re
RA.S. 47 states that a child has been abandoned if "[tlhe parent has, without
good cause, left the child without any provision for parental support and
without making arrangements to visit or communicate with the child, although

38. In re W.J.F. and H.M.S., 648 S.W.2d 210,214 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (citations
omitted); D.J.A. v. Smith, 477 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
39. WJ.F., 648 S.W.2d at 214 (citing D.E.J. v. G.H.B., 609 S.W.2d 472, 474
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980)); see also D.J.A., 477 S.W.2d at 720.
40. See also Mo. REV. STAT. Ch. 435 (1986 and Supp. 1992) (statutes on
adoption).
41. In re Y.M.H., 817 S.W.2d 279, 282 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (citing In re
M.L.W., 788 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)); see also In re R.L.P., 652
S.W.2d 185, 187 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (citing In re L.A.H., 622 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1981)).
42. YM.H., 817 S.W.2d at 282.
43. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.444 (1986).
44. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.447.2 (Supp. 1992).
45. Id § 211.447.2(1).
46. Id The length of time depends on the child's age. Id.
47. 826 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss4/6
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able to do SO." 48' This provision "requires both a finding of failure of support
and a failure to communicate with or visit the child[ ] within the statutory
period."49 In determining whether there has been abandonment a court looks
at the parent's intent, which is inferred from his conduct."0 "Abandonment
is the willful giving up of a child with the intention that the severance be of
a permanent nature."5'
Once a ground for involuntary termination has been shown by "clear,

cogent and convincing evidence," the court must decide whether termination

would be in the best interests of the child.5 2 Thus, the "best interests"
requirement applies to any termination of parental rights, whether voluntary
or involuntary.53 To further insure that the best interests of the child are
carefully considered in termination proceedings, the court must appoint a
guardian ad litem for the child.54
How does a court decide whether it is in the best interests of a child to
terminate parental rights? The statute does not specifically define "best
interests" or give a standard or test. There is some guidance, however. The
construction statute55 must be kept in mind in defining "best interests." The
statute advocates the need of every child for a permanent and stable home and
indicates a preference, when possible, for that home to be the birth home.56
In the involuntary termination statute, the legislature listed the factors to be
considered in deciding whether to terminate:
(1) The emotional ties to the birth parent;
(2) The extent to which the parent has maintained regular
visitation or other contact with the child;
(3)The extent of payment by the parent for the cost of care
and maintenance of the child when financially able to do so

48. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.447.2(1)(b) (Supp. 1992).
49. In re M.B.A., 709 S.W.2d 941, 948 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (Prewitt, J.,
dissenting) (citing J.H.H. v. J.D., 662 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)).
50. In re Adoption of W.B.L., 681 S.W.2d 452, 455 (Mo. 1984) (citing In re
T.C.M., 651 S.W.2d 525 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)).
51. In re W.J.F., 648 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (citing In re M.J.M.,
483 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972)).
52. See In re J.H.D., 748 S.W.2d 842, 842-43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
53. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 211.443, .444.1 (1986) & § 211.447.2 (Supp. 1992); In
re Y.M.H., 817 S.W.2d 279, 282 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (citing In re M.L.W., 788
S.W.2d 759, 762 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)).
54. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.462 (1986).
55. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.443 (1986). For the text of this section, see supra
note 6.
56. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.443(2), (3) (1986).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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including the time that the child is in the custody of the division
or other child-placing agency;
(5)The parent's disinterest in or lack of commitment to the
child ......

The Eastern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals, in In re JH.H.,8
stated:
While we acknowledge "the best interests of the child" to be
among those "imprecise substantive standards that leave determinations unusually open to the subjective values of the judge,"
...in the context of termination of parental rights proceedings
it c.onnotes theparenspatriaeinterest in providing the child with
a permanent home... "in which the child will be housed, fed,
clothed and educated, at least according to acceptable community
59
standards."
This interest in providing the child with a permanent home seems to come into
play in two situations: (1) When an adoption is already contemplated; or (2)
when it is evident that the birth family will not be able to provide a permanent
home in which the child will be appropriately cared for.' In the latter
instance, an alternative source (often an adoptive placement) will be sought.
B. Single ParentHouseholds and Children in Poverty.
Why We Need a Strong Policy of Child Support Enforcement
There was a threefold increase in the number of divorces from 1960 to
1980.61 The number of children involved in divorces over that same time
period increased 2.5 times. 62 In 1960 five percent of births were to unmar-

57. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.447.3 (Supp. 1992).
58. 662 S.W.2d 893 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
59. Id at 897 (citations omitted).
60. In In re Adoption of W.B.L., 681 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1984), the involuntary
termination of the mother's parental rights was upheld on grounds of abandonment and
neglect. The child's stepmother had filed a petition to adopt. Id.
at 454.
61. Lowell H. Lima & Robert C.Harris, The ChildSupportEnforcementProgram
in the UnitedStates, in CHILD SUPPORT 20 (Alfred J. Kahn & Sheila B. Kammerman
eds., 1988).

62. Id.
at21.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss4/6
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ried women; in 1990 the figure was twenty-seven percent. 63 Female-headed
families have increased steadily over the years.6'
The proportion of children living in poverty was fifteen percent in 1970
and rose to twenty percent in 1990.65 In 1983, "three-quarters of all children
born outside of marriage were [living in poverty].66 In 1991, the U.S.
Census Bureau "reported that the likelihood that a child would be living in
poverty almost doubled upon the separation or divorce of the child's
parents."'67 Single parent families headed by a female are six times as likely
to be poor as two parent families.68 It is the "lack of financial support from
the absent9 parent, usually the father, [that] is a major factor in child
6
poverty.11

When there is no support, or inadequate support, and the custodial parent

(usually the mother) has little or no income, the family likely receives welfare

benefits.7" Welfare does not, however, bring a family above the poverty
level," and "most agree that the poverty level is a very low standard of
living."' Surely everyone can think of various adverse effects that living in
poverty has on children;7" these effects provide obvious policy reasons
supporting the fight against poverty among children.

63. Barbara D. Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Apr. 1993, at 47, 50. Steven Waldman, DeadbeatDads,NEWSWEEK, May 4, 1992,
at 46, 52.
64. Lima & Harris, supra note 61, at 21. The number of such families tripled
from 1960 to 1973. The percentage these families make up out of all families
increased from seven percent to nineteen percent over that time period. Id.
65. Whitehead, supranote 63, at 48.
66. Lima & Harris, supranote 61, at 21.
67. Id

68. Waldman, supra note 63, at 46; Whitehead, supra note 63, at 47.
69. Alfred J. Kahn & Sheila B. Kammerman, ChildSupport in the UnitedStates:
The Problem, in CHILD SUPPORT, at 10 (Alfred J. Kahn & Sheila B. Kammerman eds.,
1988).
70. Kahn & Kammerman, supra note 69, at 11. See also Whitehead, supra note
63, at 62, 77.
71. Kahn & Kammerman, supra note 69, at 11; Paula Roberts, Ameliorating the
Feminizationof Poverty: Whose Responsibility?, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 883, 885
(1984).
72. Kahn & Kammerman, supra note 69, at 11.

73. If not, one can look to many studies, articles and books on the topic. See,
e.g., CHILDREN IN POVERTY: CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY (Aletha C.
Huston ed., 1991). For a brief discussion of the effects upon children of economic
changes after divorce, see LENORE J. WErrzMAN, THE DIVORCE REvOLUTION: THE
UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN

IN AMERICA 318-21 (1985).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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C. History and CurrentStatus of the Policy
of Child Support Enforcement
The moral duty of parents to support their children has been longrecognized. 4 In the middle of the eighteenth century, Blackstone stated:
The duty of parents to provide for the maintenanceof their
children, is a principle of natural law; an obligation.., laid on
them not only by nature herself but by their own proper act, in
bringing them into the world; for they would be in the highest
manner injurious to their issue, if they only gave their children
life, that they might afterwards see them perish. By begetting
them therefore, they have entered into a voluntary obligation, to
endeavor, as far as in them lies, that the life which they have
bestowed shall be supported and preserved. And thus, the
children will have a perfect rightof receiving maintenance from
their parents.
[A]nd the manner, in which this obligation shall be
performed, is thus pointed out. The father, and mother, grandfather and grandmother of poor impotent persons shall maintain
them at their own charges, if of sufficient ability.... [A]nd if
a parent runs away, and leaves his children, the churchwardens
goods, and
and overseers of the parish shall seize his rents,
75
chattels, and dispose of them toward their relief.

Addressing the issue of child support, the Missouri Supreme Court in
shall also
1957 said that "he who performs a man's part in procreation
76
perform a man's part in providing support for his progeny.

74. ScoTr E.

FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS:

A

101 (1992). For a discussion of history of public child support
enforcement policy, see JUDTrrH CAssErTY, CHILD SUPPORT AND PUBLIC POLICY:
SECURING SUPPORT FROM ABSENT FATHERS 5-14 (1978); Kahn & Kammerman, supra
note 69, at 10-13, 24-25; JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA:

HANDBOOK

PRACTICAL ADVICE FOR NEGOTIATING AND COLLECTING A FAIR SETTLEMENT 1-10

(1986).
75. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND:

IN FOUR BOOKS 447-48 (1765).

In addition, various authors writing about child

support have quoted Blackstone. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 74, at 101; Harry
D. Krause, ChildSupport Reassessed: Limits of PrivateResponsibilityand the Public
Interest, 24 FAM. L.Q. 1, 6 (1990); LIEBERMAN, supra note 74, at ix.
76. Ivey v. Ayers, 301 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Mo. 1957). The quote was in reference

to one of the main purposes of the Uniform Support of Dependents Law (currently
titled Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law, Mo. REV. STAT.§§ 454.010.360 (1986 and Supp. 1992)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss4/6
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More recently, enforcement of child support has become an increasingly
important policy.77 In the mid-1970s, Congress enacted legislation to
strengthen child support enforcement nationwide, 8 in an attempt to decrease
the numbers of families on welfare.79 Since that time, the scope and purpose
of such legislation has been expanded by Congress to attempt to prevent
families from going on welfare by making the services available to nonwelfare
families.8" The federal act mandates the states to organize child support
enforcement agencies.8 In 1984, Congress strengthened the enforcement
power of the states in collecting child support."2 The 1984 Child Support
Amendments provided for withholding past due support from paychecks,
deducting it from federal and state tax refunds, imposing liens on the property
of defaulting support obligors, and informing credit companies of high
amounts of unpaid child support.83 The 1988 amendments provided that
beginning in 1994, child support will be withheld from paychecks whether or
not the payee is in arrears.' The states are to establish support guidelines
and review child support orders triennially." The 1988 amendments provide
for better tracking and monitoring in the parent location service."
Additionally, Congress established the U.S. Commission on Interstate Child
Support, which issued its first report in August 1992.87 The Commission
seeks nationalization, if not federalization, of child support laws.88
The problem of child support enforcement has not been limited to
families on welfare. According to U.S. Census Bureau figures, "t[i]n 1983
more than 5 million women were supposed to receive court-ordered child
support payments, yet only half received full payments, 25 percent partial

77. See infra text accompanying notes 78-108.
78. Krause, supra note 75, at 6.
79. See id.
80. Id
81. Id. at 7.
82. Id at 8-11.
83. Id at 8; see also Diane Dodson & Robert Horowitz, What to Do About the
Growing Problem of ChildSupport, 71 A.B.A. J.133, 133 (1985); Claudia J.Postell,
Unpaid Child Support: A $3-Billion Debt, 22 TRIAL 89 (1986).
84. Krause, supra note 75, at 11.
85. Id
86. Id
87. Robert G. Spector, The Nationalization of Family Law: An Introduction to
the Manualfor the Coming Age, 27 FAM. L.Q. 1, 3 (1993).
88. Id.The entire Spring 1993 issue of the Family Law Quarterlyis devoted to
the reports and recommendations of the Commission. See generally 27 FAM. L.Q.
(1993).
89. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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payments, and 25 percent no payment at all. More than 3.7 million additional
women raising children alone did not even have support orders."9
Missouri complied with the federal requirements by enacting the
Enforcement of Support Law,9 which includes the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Law.' The Missouri Division of Child Support93
Enforcement was created by Missouri Revised Statutes section 454.400.
The responsibilities of the division include "locating absent parents, establishing paternity, establishing support obligations, monitoring absent parents'
compliance with support obligations, enforcing support obligations, and
' Missouri's domestic relations statutes also
distributing support collections."94
provide for withholding delinquent child support payments from income.95
Missouri also has a criminal nonsupport statute which makes it at least
a misdemeanor to knowingly fail to provide, "without good cause, adequate
support which such parent is legally obligated to provide for his minor
child."9 Support includes food, clothes, housing, and health care.97 This
statute "'has as its foundation the object of securing to children from their
parent the discharge of the duty of support, and the punishment' of
those who
98
are so morally bankrupt as to refuse or ignore that obligation. '
Both parents have a legal duty to support their minor children. 99 This
duty "cannot be 'bargained away. '"" °' Parents may enter into an agreement
compromising the amount of past due child support, but they cannot agree to

90. See Dodson & Horowitz, supranote 83, at 133; see also Waldman, supranote
63, at 46.

91. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 454.010-.360 (1986 and Supp. 1992); see also Mo. CODE
REGS., tit. 13, § 30-1.010 (1988).
92. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 454.010-.360 (1986 and Supp. 1992).
93. Mo. CODE REGS., tit. 13, § 30-1.010 (1988).
94. Id
95. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.350 (Supp. 1992).
96. Mo. REV. STAT. § 568.040.1 (Supp. 1992).
97. Mo. REV. STAT. § 568.040.2(3) (Supp. 1992).
98. State v. Davis, 675 S.W.2d 410, 415 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting State v.
Arnett, 370 S.W.2d 169, 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963)).
99. Id.; Deardorff v. Bohannon, 761 S.W.2d 651, 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)
(citations omitted).
100. Davis, 675 S.W.2d at 415 (quoting Arnett, 370 S.W.2d at 174); see also
Koenig v. Koenig, 191 S.W.2d 269, 272 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol58/iss4/6

10

1993]

Heisinger: Heisinger:
Child Support
Properly a Factor
RIGHTS
OF PARENTAL
TERMINATION

reduce future support amounts.' ' "Only a court has [that] power."' 2 A
court's primary concern in child support cases is the needs of the children. 3
The primary purpose of a child support order is "to provide for the
welfare of the children."" Missouri courts have shown that this state's
policy is to look to both parents to provide support. Just because the mother

may be able to provide for the children's needs does not mean the father
Courts in Missouri are
should be relieved of his child support obligation.'
pay truly cannot
he
cannot
that
asserts
who
a
father
careful to make sure that
7 the court imputed income to a father
In Hogrebe v. Hogrebe,'
do so.'
who "voluntarily reduced his income." The court said that a father could "not
escape responsibility to his family ... by deliberately limiting his work to
reduce his income.... Nor may he voluntarily decline to work and then plead
lack of income as an excuse for not being able to adequately contribute to his
children's needs."'0 8 Imputing income shows that courts do not want parents
evading their obligation to support their children, further demonstrating the
important policy of full child support.

D. Specific CasesAddressing Voluntary Termination
of ParentalRights in View of Child Support Obligation
The Missouri case of In re B.L. G. ' addressed the issue of whether the
trial court was correct in voluntarily terminating the parental rights of an
adoptive father."' The adoptive father had married the birth mother when

101. Holt v. Holt, 662 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
102. Id. "ITihe law in this state is well settled that parents may not enter into an
agreement for the payment of child support which will deprive the court of its power
to set the amount of support and to change that amount as conditions change....
Mhe law prevents the parents from entering into a binding agreement for support,
except for obligations which are above and beyond that which the law requires."
Kocherov v. Kocherov, 775 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); see also Otten v.
Otten, 632 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Kennedy v. Kennedy, 575
S.W.2d 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978)).
103. State ex rel. Division of Family Serv. v. Ruble, 684 S.W.2d 949, 950 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1985).
104. Williams v. Williams, 510 S.W.2d 452, 455 (Mo. 1974).
105. Id
106. See infra text accompanying notes 107-08.
107. 727 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
108. Id. at 195-96 (citing Butler v. Butler, 562 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977) and Boyer v. Boyer, 567 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978)).
109. 731 S.W.2d 492 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
110. B.L.G., 731 S.W.2d at 494.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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the child was nearly three years old."' Two years after the marriage, he
adopted the child."' The parents were divorced"' and a year later, the
No
adoptive father sought voluntary termination of parental rights.'
adoption of the child by another man was contemplated." 5 The child did
not know that his father had adopted him, but he did consider the man to be
his father and asked questions about his lack of contact with him." 6 The

Southern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals said that the issue was
whether the termination was in the best interests of the child." 7 The court
pointed out that the father "was primarily interested in seeking relief from the
financial burdens imposed on him by his parenthood and delineated in the...
dissolution decree.""' 8 The court said that "[c]onsent alone is not sufficient"
to terminate parental rights." 9 The juvenile officer who files a petition for
voluntary termination of parental rights, though not required to by statute,
should make a reasonable investigation before filing the petition. 20 He
"must act in a role beyond that of a mere tool of a parent whose primary
The court
motivation is that of avoiding parental responsibilities."''
determined that relieving the father of his child support obligations would not
be in the child's best interests."2
Other states have similarly viewed the role parental support obligation
plays in voluntary termination hearings. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals
addressed the issue of voluntary termination of parental rights in In re
A.B.'I In this case, the mother of the child sought to have the biological
father's rights terminated. 2 4 The father consented to the termination."z
The father said he had not established any kind of relationship with his
daughter and thought it would be in her best interests to terminate. 6
Paternity had been adjudicated and he was ordered to pay $435 per month in

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id
Id.
Id at 493.
Id.
at 495, 498.
Id at 495.
Id.
at 498.
Id.
at 499.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
444 N.W.2d 415 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
124. Id.at 416-17.
125. Id.
126. Id at 417.
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child support.'27 The Wisconsin stat providing for voluntary termination of
parental rights provided that "'[t]he best interests of the child shall be the
prevailing factor considered by the court in determining the disposition of all
[termination] proceedings."'"2" The Wisconsin statute, unlike Missouri's,
specifically told a court what factors to consider "in ascertaining the child's
best interests."'2 9 The court, said that "[p]arental rights may not be
terminated merely to advance the parents' convenience and interests, either
emotional or financial."'130 "Simply put, no parent may blithely walk away
from his or her parental responsibilities."131 The court concluded that it was
not in the daughter's best interests to terminate parental rights as it would cut
"'[t]ermination
off a financial support line for her. 32 The court noted that
' 33
of parental rights is also termination of the child's rights. 1
The Supreme Court of Alabama considered the appropriateness of
termination of a father's rights to his birth child in Ex parte Brooks. 34 In
Alabama, termination of parental rights must be in the best interests of the
child. 35 The court determined that it was not the purpose of the statutes
providing for termination to be "a means for a parent to avoid his obligation
to support his child."' 36 "Convenience of the parents is not a sufficient basis
Even if [the father] chooses not to
for terminating parental rights ....
establish contact 37with his son, [the son's] right to receive support from his
father remains."
In In re D.W.K, the Supreme Court of Iowa also addressed these
issues. 3 1 The father expressed no interest in his child. 139 He had been
ordered to pay seventy-five dollars per month in child support. 4 ' Iowa's
voluntary termination statute provided that "'[t]he welfare of the child ...

127. Id. at 416.
128. Id. at 418 n.5 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 48.426(2) (1987)).
129. Id. at 418-19 (quoting WIs. STAT. § 48.426(3) (1987)). A court is not

limited to those factors, however. See id.
130. Id. at 419 (citing, inter alia, B.L.G., 731 S.W.2d at 498-99).
131. Id. at 419.
132. Id.
133. Id (alteration in original).
134. 513 So. 2d 614 (Ala. 1987) rev'dsub nom. on othergrounds Exparte Karen

Beasley, 564 So. 2d 950 (Ala. 1990).
135. Id. at 616.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 617.
138. 365 N.W.2d 32 (Iowa 1985).
139. Id. at 33.
140. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

13

Missouri
Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 6
MISSOURI

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

shall be the paramount consideration."""' The court said that allowing
termination in this situation would "ultimately... open a hatch for a parent
to escape his or her duty to support a child."' 42 In support of its conclusion,
the court cited cases in which fathers tried to avoid paying child support by
"willfully refusing to reach [their] reasonable earning capacit[ies]" or
"channeling money into unprofitable businesses" or "unreasonably remain[ing]
in... low-paying job[s]."'43
E. DiscriminationAgainst Men as Parents
Most issues of "father's rights" seem to deal with a father being denied
an equal role as parent in one way or another.' It is a relatively new area in
the law. The R.A.S. court found no basis for the father's assertion of disparate
treatment. 45 The parameters of Equal Protection claims as grounds for
allowing fathers to voluntarily terminate their parental rights have not been
defined by the courts.

141. Id at 34 (quoting IOWA CODE § 600.1A).
142. Id. at 35.
143. Id. (citations omitted).
144. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (unmarried absent father's
constitutional rights not violated by receiving no notice of termination proceeding
though state actually knew his whereabouts); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979) (violates constitution to allow unmarried women but not unmarried men to
block adoption by withholding consent); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978)
(termination was constitutional when only consent of mother was required for adoption
of illegitimate children and biological father had never legitimated the child in 11
years); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (statutory presumption that unmarried
fathers are unfit held unconstitutional); Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216 (Cal.
1992) (unwed father's effective preclusion from establishing his parental relationship
deemed unconstitutional); In re J.F., 719 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. 1986) (allowing no notice
of termination of parental rights proceeding to putative fathers who fail to affirm
paternity); State v. Edwards, 574 S.W.2d 405 (Mo. 1978) (unmarried father cannot be
denied same presumption of fitness as a parent that married fathers are given in

termination proceedings).
145. RA.S., 826 S.W.2d at 401. See supra note 35 for the court's comment on
the matter.
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IV.

THE INSTANT DECISION

After reciting the facts". and the applicable standard of review,'47 the
court discussed the father's points of error,'48 focusing primarily on the first
two. 49 The father urged that the trial court erred in finding that it was not
in R.A.S.'s best interests to terminate parental rights.5 He contended that
the court gave insufficient weight to the negative emotional effects of
continuing the legal relationship and gave too much weight to the issue of
child support.' 5' In response, the court of appeals noted that there was no
evidence supporting the father's assertion that the relationship, or lack thereof,
was adversely affecting the child.' 52 The court also questioned the father's
concern for the child in making that assertion, given his "total lack of care or
concern for R.A.S.... demonstrated by his lack of contact with the
child."' The father did not "convincingly point out how termination would
turmoil R.A.S. experienced as a result of the attitude of
alter the emotional
154
flather."'
[the
The court observed that the father's argument appeared to be "a
transparent attempt to avoid support" of the child. 5 The court briefly
recited the statutory basis for voluntary termination of parental rights, 56 and
concluded that the phrase "best interests of the child" was the center of the
dispute in the case. 7 The father asserted that if this action had sought
involuntary termination, it would have been granted and, as such, it met the
"best interests of the child" requirement. 8 To support this contention, 59
the father adverted to In re WF.J.6 and In re R.L.P.'' The court distinguished those cases from the instant case on the basis that they were

146. Id. at 398-99, 401. See supra text accompanying notes 10-27.
147. RA.S., 826 S.W.2d at 399.
148. Id. at 399-401. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
149. See RA.S., 826 S.W.2d at 398, 399-401. See supra notes 28-29 and
accompanying text.
150. RA.S., 826 S.W.2d at 399.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 401.
155. Id. at 399.
156. Id.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id
Id.
Id. at 399.
648 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
652 S.W.2d 185 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

15

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 6

MISSOURILAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

involuntary termination proceedings. 62 The court concluded that the instant
case more closely resembled In re B.L.G 63 It discussed B.L.G., "in which
the adoptive father of a child attempted to voluntarily terminate his parental
rights to his adoptive son after the father's divorce from the child's mother.0' 64 The court submitted that in B.L.G., there was evidence that the child
was confused about the relationship with his absent adoptive father, which
caused the child stress. 65 The R.A.S. court also noted the similarity to the
instant case in that neither father chose to have contact with his child, even
though there was no interference by the mother.'6 The court quoted at
length from B.L.G.:
"Consent [of the parent whose rights are to be terminated] alone
is not sufficient. The petition must be filed by the juvenile
officer and the evidence must support a finding that termination
is in the best interests of the child.... [T]he juvenile officer
who files the petition must act in a role beyond that of a mere
tool of a parent whose primary
motivation is that of avoiding
67
parental responsibilities."'
The court also recited the portion of B.L.G. which stated that the adoptive
father had orchestrated the whole termination proceeding to relieve himself of
68
his duty of child support, which was not in the best interests of the child. 69
The court then looked to other jurisdictions to support its holding.
It cited Ex parte Brooks,'7" in which the Alabama Supreme Court held that
"convenience [of the parents] is not a sufficient reason for terminating parental
rights."' 7' The R.A.S. court also cited the Wisconsin case In re A.B. 72 for
its statement that "'no parent may blithely walk away from his or her parental
responsibilities. '" 73 Finally, the R.A.S. court cited the Iowa case of In re
D.W.K'7 4 for its conclusion that allowing such a termination would
162. See RA.S., 826 S.W.2d at 400.
163. 731 S.W.2d 492 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); see R.A.S., 826 S.W.2d at 400.
164. RA.S., 826 S.W.2d at 400.
165. Id. (citing B.L.G., 731 S.W.2d at 495).
166. Id. (citing B.L.G., 731 S.W.2d at 496-97).
167. Id. (quoting B.L.G., 731 S.W.2d at 499).
168. Id
169. Id
170. 513 So. 2d 614 (Ala. 1987), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds Ex parte
Karen Beasley, 564 So. 2d 950 (Ala. 1990).
171. RA.S., 826 S.W.2d at 400 (citing Brooks, 513 So.2d at 617 (Ala. 1987)).
172. 444 N.W.2d 415 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
173. RA.S., 826 S.W.2d at 400 (quoting A.B., 444 N.W.2d at 419).
174. 365 N.W.2d 32 (Iowa 1985).
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"'ultimately...
open a hatch for a parent to escape his or her duty to support
' 75
a child. "
Relying on Holt v. Holt 6 and Koenig v. Koenig, 7 R.A.S.'s father
asserted that the policy of child support was a weak one. 8 He urged that
these cases supported his contention because they upheld settlement agreements between parents on past due support "without resort to the courts.' 79
The court acknowledged these holdings, but clarified that the settlements
upheld concerned past due supportf8 -- the rule of law was not applicable
support,M and the underlying duty of support was not affectto future
82
ed.1
The court stressed the seriousness of the policy of child support,"
stating that both parents have the duty to support their minor children.'
It pointed out that there are criminal sanctions for failure to meet child support
duties,'85 thus evidencing that the policy is far from weak.' 86 The court
proclaimed that the duty of child support cannot "be avoided in the guise of
a voluntary termination proceeding. The termination of parental rights does
not merely sever the rights of the parent to the child, but also severs the
child's right to the parent."'8 7 The court said that even though the child
deserved more than minimal legal ties to a parent, terminating those ties was
not in his best interests. 188
The court affirmed Judge Hamilton's dismissal of the petition for
voluntary termination.' 89 In summary, the court said that "[t]he termination
of [the fjather's parental rights would deprive R.A.S. of his future rights to
support, affiliation and inheritance without any evidence of a present benefit
to RIA.S. resulting from the termination. These circumstances were properly

175. RA.S., 826 S.W.2d at 400 (quoting D.W.K, 365 N.W.2d at 35).
176. 662 S.W.2d 578 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
177. 191 S.W.2d 269 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945).

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
1988)).
185.

RA.S., 826 S.W.2d at 399.
Id.
See id. at 399-400.
Id. at 400 (citing Holt, 662 S.W.2d at 580).
Id. at 399 (citing Koenig, 191 S.W.2d at 272).
Id. at 400-01.
Id. (citing Deardoff v. Bohannon, 761 S.W.2d 651, 655 (Mo. Ct. App.

Id. at 401 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 568.040 (Supp. 1992)).

186. Id

187. Id.
188. See id.
189. Id.
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considered by the trial court in its decision that the termination did not serve
R.A.S.'s best interests."'a g
V. COMMENT
A. Allowing Voluntary TerminationIs No Solution
to DisparateTreatment of Fathers
In R.A.S., the father attempted to "make an equal protection argument
claiming that because he is a male he was treated differently than a female
similarly situated would be treated.' 191 He gave no support for his assertion."9 The court noted that the "[f]ather's indictment of the system is
largely dependent upon the illustration of a mother's voluntary termination of
her parental rights for the purpose of placing the child for adoption." 93
It is likely that the father has a valid point in that the law treats males
and females differently as parents. Some of the problems seem to arise
because of the physiological aspects of biological parenthood-the biological
mother usually carries the child and gives birth. She certainly is aware of her
parenthood at some time or another. The father can know of his parenthood
only through the mother, in a sense. A woman can report the child's father
as "unknown" and keep it from him, and the man may never know he has
offspring.
All persons should see the unfairness in this. But the solution is not
certain. "Father's rights" are relatively new issues in the law, and their future
is unclear. 1" Under the guise of Equal Protection, a father should not be
allowed to voluntarily terminate his parental rights in a situation such as in
RA.S. just because a mother can keep her pregnancy and a child's birth secret
from the father and subsequently give that child up for adoption. The father
of R.A.S. made this very asertion."95 Surely two wrongs do not make a
right.

190. Id.
191. d
192. Id

193. Id
194. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
195. RA.S., 826 S.W.2d at 401.
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B. Child Support Properly a Factor in Determining
Best Interests of Child
In In re R.A.S., the Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals
correctly upheld the trial court's dismissal of the petition for voluntary
termination of the absent father's parental rights.'96 A termination must be
in the best interests of the child 97 and here, it was not in the best interests
of R.A.S. 98
Children have a right to adequate support from their parents-both
parents.'
Strong policy concerns require enforcing this right and the
corresponding duty of the parent to provide support.2" Many of the current
laws on child support were enacted to get families off welfare or to prevent
them from having to go on welfare to begin with. "° There are many singleparent families in this country,2" and most of them are female-headed.0 3
They account for a great number of the children who live in poverty.2 °4
Welfare does not bring a family above that poverty line.20 5 Lack of
enforcement of child support contributes to these problems.
Pervasive problems exist in child support enforcement, as evidenced by
the low percentage of mothers who receive the full amount ordered and the
high number of women who do not even have a child support order to try to
enforce.2" The federal and state governments have done much to try to fix
these problems,0 7 but the results will not be immediately evident. However,
the strong policy is manifest." 8 It must not be undermined by allowing
absent fathers to get out of paying child support by voluntarily terminating
their parental rights, in the absence of it being in the best interests of the
child.
With an absent parent, the minimal tie that exists is a legal tie. The right
to receive support, the right to affiliation, and the right to inherit still

196. See id
197. See supra notes 38-60 and accompanying text.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

RA.S., 826 S.W.2d at 401.
See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 74-107 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 78-88, 91-98 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 74-108 and accompanying text.
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exist.2
A termination order would sever those rights."' With all the
problems of poverty in female-headed households,' how could it be in the

best interests of the child to take away financial support that could make the
difference for the child? This proposition is not meant to suggest that
termination should be allowed if a mother is able to adequately provide for the
child on her own, or if the absent father has no resources from which to
provide child support.2" 2 The dangers of such a proposition are too
great-no one's financial status is permanent.2" 3
Missouri courts have already held that a father cannot purposefully be
underemployed or use other deceptive techniques to get out of paying his child
support obligation.2" 4 If the court had allowed the father of R.A.S. to
voluntarily terminate his rights, it would provide a way out for every absent
father in the state, so long as a juvenile officer agreed to file the petition.
Termination in those circumstances, without more, is not in the best interests
of the child.215
There was no plan for R.A.S. to be adopted;2 6 otherwise, termination
may have been in his best interests. Adoption by a stepfather would have
provided a reinforcing legal bond with the adoptive father and severed legal
ties to an absent and uncaring father, thus making the child's home a
permanent one.217
Thus, the child's right to support is thus properly a factor in determining
whether it is in the best interests of a child to terminate parental rights.2 18
if termination would do nothing for the child but sever legal ties and thereby
cut off the right to support, termination should be denied.2 Perhaps an
attorney in B.L.G. said it best: "'[We] don't want the... Juvenile Office to
turn into the Acme Termination of Parental Rights Service for fathers who
0°
don't want to pay child support.'
KHRISTINE ANN HEISINGER

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See RA.S., 826 S.W.2d at 401.
See id.
See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
See Krause, supra note 75, at 6.
See id.
See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
See R.A.S., 826 S.W.2d at 401.
Id.
See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
RA.S., 826 S.W.2d at 399-401.
See id. at 401.
In re B.L.G., 731 S.W.2d 492, 497 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
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